



## Digital Taiwan 數位台灣

The Taiwanese Government has set in motion the Challenge 2008 development plan to “foster the creativity and talent Taiwan needs to transform itself into a ‘green silicon island’”. (GIO Report) Terms including “digital Taiwan,” “e-Taiwan,” “e-nation,” “virtual Taiwan” and “smart Taiwan,” all signal a recognition that Taiwan must go online to survive in a post-media global economy. Taiwan is redesigning itself as a large MICE (meetings, incentives, conventions and exhibitions) environment that can act as a neon showroom, or shopfront in the global village for an expanding range of high tech yet affordable products. As a recent introduction essay to an art exhibition at the National Taiwan Museum of Fine Arts stated, “the rapid rise of international transport links and information technology over the last few years has served to accelerate the development of what might be called “Global Village” consciousness, which has had an equally deep and lasting impact on Taiwanese culture, infusing it with a new vitality.” ([www.tmoa.gov.tw](http://www.tmoa.gov.tw)) There is both a level of excitement about the opportunities a post-media world can bring to Taiwan and a certain anxiety about what a global world might mean for a country struggling to be heard and recognised as an independent subject with a voice and distinct identity.

台灣政府已開始推動挑戰2008年的發展計畫，並宣布要「加強台灣所需的創意與潛能，使台灣轉型為一個『綠色矽島』」（新聞局報告）。「數位台灣」、「E化台灣」、「E化國家」、「虛擬台灣」和「聰明台灣」等等詞語，全都顯出台灣必須在一個後媒體的全球經濟中求生存。台灣將自身重新設計為一個MICE的大環境(即會議、刺激、慣例與展覽的字母縮寫)，它可以作為一個霓虹燈展示間，也能作為地球村裡的一月店面，在持

續的擴張範圍下，販售著一般人也負擔得起的高科技產品。正如國立台灣美術館最近的一篇展覽簡介所指出的：「由於近年來國際海空交通和資訊科技的急速發展，加快了『地球村』意識的提早來臨，為台灣文化的新生，帶來深遠的影響。」（台灣美術丹露展www.tmoa.gov.tw）。令人興奮的是，後媒體世界將為台灣開創的機會；但不安的是，對一個正努力發聲、要讓世界認同為具有明確身分的獨立主權國家而言，這種全球化的世界究竟會意味著什麼。

The notion of a “global world system” promises to multiply the circulation of differences in a democratic utopia of free trade ideals. Yet judging by the evidence of the last five hundred years of colonial and post colonial rule around the globe, a “total system” of anything (art, music, cars TV) probably means an increasingly totalising ideology under the banner of “hybridity,” “multiculturalism” or “globalism.” The key issue is always one of power and control, even when dealing with the seemingly apolitical economy of art and aesthetics. A cyber world of pure information has the potential to become even less democratic and more totalitarian than the actual world. In many ways the war has already gone online.

「全球世界體系」的概念，承諾著一個具有自由貿易理想的民主烏托邦，其中差異的循環流通將大為增加。然而，根據全球過去500年來的殖民與後殖民規則，一個「全方面系統」（包括藝術、音樂、汽車、電視等等）很可能意味著一個打著「混雜性」、「多元文化主義」或「全球主義」旗幟的極權意識型態。其中的關鍵議題永遠是關於權力與控制，即使處理的是看似與政治無關的藝術美學經濟亦然。一個純資訊的電腦世界，有可能成為一個比真實世界更不民主、更集權主義的世界。就許多方面而言，戰爭已經上線了。

### *Tele-Taiwan*

Nations are being replaced by what Paul Virilio calls “tele-continents” made up of instantaneous messaging systems. Such cybernetic interactive communities represent the disappearance of analogue modes of communication and the end of geography, as we knew it. Following on the tele-Taiwanese strategy is innovative and bold – to become an ISP (international service provider) and educate the “e-generation”, go online and up load Taiwan into the virtual world. Such a transformative vision of a virtual software society must also mean the actual hard disc society is healthy and stable. Surfing (being immersed) on line still means living off line. This is recognised by the plan when it says that Taiwan must be engaged in a “life-long learning system” that can also provide social services, integrated learning resources, and a connected civil service.

### 電傳台灣

國家已被保羅·維希留所謂的「電傳洲陸」所取代，意味著一種由即時訊息系統所組成的空間。這種電腦控制的互動溝通顯出過去類比的溝通模式已然消失，我們所認識的地理亦告終結。而隨著「電傳台灣」策略而來的乃是創新與大膽，例如成為國際網路供應者（ISP）、教育「E世代」，將台灣連線上傳至虛擬世界等等。這種虛擬軟體社群的變化視野，也意味著真實的硬碟社會必是健康穩定的。連線上網仍舊意味著離線生活。就像有人說台灣應致力於「終身學習系

統」，提供社會服務、整合學習資源，以及連結的市民服務。

### *Supra-Taiwan*

New digital technologies, Internet communications and modular manufacturing systems (hybrid cars, houses, bodies), have no need for nation states. A state is a petrified fixed entity. A digital world is an ocean of waves, flows and surges. Bradley Winterton, in his review of June Yip's *Envisioning Taiwan*, notes that "Taiwan is now approaching a state of being supra-national, voyaging into the future as the first place on earth to actually inhabit the condition of being somewhere beyond the nation-state." (Winterton, 2004) Taiwan is both post-national and post-industrial.

### 超台灣

新數位科技、網路溝通與模具製造系統（如雙動力汽車、房子、機身等），並不是民族國家的需要。國家是種僵化固定的整體，而數位的世界是一片充滿浪潮、水流與波濤的海洋。溫特頓在評論葉菁的《展望台灣》時說道：「台灣目前正邁向一個超國家的狀態，迫不及待地航向未來，並居住在某種民族國家之外的狀況。」（溫特頓，2004）台灣乃是後國家的，亦是後工業的。

Having entering the post industrial portal of the 21st century we are faced with the collapse of private local blind spots and any meaningful distinctions between domestic and foreign policy. We have entered the age of disappearances. We are witnessing an increasingly rapid loss of resources, species, languages and customs. A physical Surreal Daliesque world of melting polar icecaps is being painted by the heat generated by post-industrial economies of condensed energy outcomes – nano-machines, biotech hybrids and info bots. The ecological cost of mobile communications technologies, to name but one example, is only now becoming evident in the impact of mining rare metals in tropical rainforests of Africa and Asia.

239

進入廿一世紀後工業的大門，我們面對的是地方盲點與國內外政策區別的瓦解。我們已進入一個消失的年代，見證著資源、物種、語言與習俗的加速失去。後工業經濟的密集能源產生了奈米機器、生物工藝混種與資訊機器人等，這些成果發出的熱度因此勾勒出一座帶有北極融化冰帽的達利式超現實物質世界。舉個例子，由於在亞非熱帶雨林開採稀有礦物帶來的衝擊，這些行動傳達科技付出的生態代價直到如今才變得顯明。

The desire to produce cool outcomes rather than hot by-products is a strategic objective that follows on from Marshal McLuhan's maxim of the medium dominating the message. Technological determinism of the content and design of communications and new media art also has an ecological cost attached. The smaller and more powerful the high tech gadget the larger the ecological cost in energy terms seems to be.

製造出酷成品而非熱門產品的慾望其實是種策略性目標，這是衍伸自馬歇爾·麥克魯漢提出的座

右銘「媒介決定訊息」。科技決定著傳達藝術與新媒體藝術的內容與設計，而這同樣有其附帶的生態代價。高科技的零件越小越有力，能源方面的生態代價似乎就越高。

Frederic Jameson dubbed Taiwan in the 1990s as prime example of a post-modern country because it could successfully produce any internal technological outcome for any given design brief. Give the Taiwanese a box and they will make it perform any function you require, runs the story. Taiwan is the “outcomes country” – the fully wired up zappy country that has any given time has more of its population connected to the outside world than inside the country. Sporting all the latest compact reverse parking sensors Taiwan can fit in anywhere in tight global traffic. Recognising that Taiwan can not hope to compete with the economic, military or political might of its Asian neighbours, the best option is for the country to become a source of expert art directors, designers, project managers, programmers and high tech manufacturers. In short the brains rather than the brawn of the China Seas.

在九〇年代，詹明信將台灣稱為後現代國家的首要代表，因為它能將所獲得的任何設計理念成功地製成內部科技的成果。給台灣人一個盒子，他們就能讓它執行任何你所要求的功能。台灣是「成品國家」；這個接上電線的活躍國家有許多與外界聯繫的人口，甚至比對內的多。例如，所有新出品的小型倒車感應器，台灣人都能將它們套進緊密交通的任何位置。由於台灣無法奢望在經濟、軍事或政治力量上和其他亞洲鄰居競爭，因此，這個國家的最佳選擇便是提供專業的藝術指導、設計者、企劃者、程式設計者和高科技製造者。簡而言之便是發展腦袋，而不是中國海域的發達肌肉。

With over 20 million people jammed into an island the size of Tasmania, Taiwan has no territorial room to move. The only expansionist opportunities for Taiwan lie in virtual hyperspace.

想像2,000萬人擠進澳洲塔斯梅尼亞島般大小的島嶼，台灣並沒有可供移動的領土空間。台灣唯一的擴張機會便在於虛擬的超空間。

#### *Flash-drive Taiwan*

Taiwan is the high speed RAM chip, the parallel processor island (a flash drive) lying off the coast of the China motherboard. For the KMT (Kuo Ming Tang) Taiwan is an external hard disc of memories always already downloaded in a return to the impossible grand narrative of pre-communist China or perhaps a new post industrial democratic capitalist China. For the DPP, (Democratic Peoples Party) Taiwan is an independent laptop computer packed with all the latest features – go anywhere, do anything independent young player on the international stage. For the indigenous Aborigines, Taiwan is a difficult imposed platform with an annoying operating system (a Bill Gates PC to their intuitive Mac thinking). Still they are survivors and continue to innovate and produce ingenious third party software at small cost and great effect in a marketplace that pays them little real notice other than as exotic products of night markets and tourist promotions.



### 台灣隨身碟

台灣是個高速的記憶體晶片，是外掛於中國主機板的平行處理器島嶼（隨身碟）。對國民黨而言，台灣是個下載完成的外接記憶硬碟，隨時預備回到不可能的宏大敘述中，也就是前共產主義的中國，或者可能是個後工業的民主資本主義新中國。對民進黨而言，台灣是台配備最新功能的獨立筆記型電腦，是個在國際舞台上獨立行事的年輕演員。而對本土的原住民而言，台灣是個灌入惱人作業系統的麻煩平台，就像他們本能的蘋果電腦式思考碰上了比爾蓋茲的個人電腦一樣。但他們仍然生存下來，持續以低廉的成本創新、製造出精巧的第三軟體，並在市場中獲得極大的成效；然而，這個市場卻很少真正注意他們，充其量將其視為夜市或觀光促銷的異國特產。

Taiwan is also prone to paranoid episodes that bring on inferiority cringing or nationalistic tantrums. Like any heavily colonised island country (Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Cyprus, Hong Kong), Taiwan has developed a strength to both resist change and accommodate innovation. The paranoid (fear of the other) battles with the schizo (fracturing universals) in a fertile and reactionary process by turns. Caught between the great ideological stonewalls of the ONE CHINA POLICY and USA FOREIGN POLICY, Taiwan has had to finesse a fine sense of method acting. Taiwan is the Ireland of the East. Largely ignored (but all too invisible in cold war terms) on the world stage since 1945, Taiwan now is at the epicentre of the 21st Century new cyber world order.

台灣同時也具有偏執情節的傾向，也因此引起自卑畏縮或國家主義的憤怒。就像任何經過深度殖民的島嶼國家一樣，如愛爾蘭、澳大利亞、紐西蘭、塞浦路斯、香港等等，台灣已發展出既能抵抗改變又能順應革新的力量。在豐富與反動的交替過程中，偏執傾向（對他者的懼怕）與精神分裂（破裂的宇宙）始終不斷戰鬥。卡在「一個中國」和「美國對外政策」的意識形態障礙之間，台灣必須具有施展方法演技的良好感受力。台灣是東方的愛爾蘭。自從1945年以後，台灣便飽受世界舞台的忽略（在冷戰時期簡直是看不見的），但如今台灣正站立於廿一世紀電腦世界新秩序的中心。



*An island with no center*


Taiwan is also an island without a single center. Taiwan is one large interconnected network of shopping malls, theme parks, and entertainment spots, night and day markets. From the windows of flying monorail above the city you can gaze down the line of endless streets boasting the latest fashion labels stretching into the infinity of one point perspective.

無中心的島嶼

台灣也是個沒有單一中心的島嶼。台灣是一張內部彼此連結的巨大網絡，包括購物中心、主題公園、娛樂場所、夜市和白天市場。從飛越城市上方的單軌捷運向窗外望去，你可以往下觀看吹噓著最新時尚標籤的無盡街道線條，向單點透視的無限空間延伸而去。

Millions of motorbikes and cars somehow seamlessly multitrack the roads in a metaphoric mirror of the underground fibre-optic network systems. There are no footpaths in Taiwan. No one has the time to waste being the Parisian flaneur (casual walker) here. The Western retail planing logic of discreet hierarchy of upmarket fashion houses in high street down to dirty mechanic shops on the edge of town has no credence in Taiwan or much of Asian generally. You can find a motorbike repair shop next to Yves Saint Laurent or a cheap café or barber shop next to the Bank of Twain. Such polymorphic, rhizomatic





logic has pre-wired Taiwan for the digital revolution much more readily than in the Western world of rigid linear urban machines driven by more concrete thinking. Taiwan has a network of hyper-centres made up of interconnected and overlapping peripheries. Like some giant realty TV show house, everyone in Taiwan is remotely wired with remote mics and mobile phones. The gaze of web cam is never averted. The laptop is never shutdown. The network connections are always open. As a house member of the international reality TV BIG BROTHER show, Taiwan is always in a paranoid state of being always nominated by big creeps and then voted off by a fickle public of not so united nations. It is a fact that only a few opportunistic Pacific island voters have recognised Taiwan as a real country to date.

某種程度上，數以百萬的汽機車使道路變成無縫隙的多重軌道，彷彿一幅地下光纖網絡系統的隱喻鏡像。台灣沒有散步小徑，這裡沒有人能夠像巴黎遊蕩者一樣消磨時間。西方的零售業安排邏輯是種謹慎的階級制度，從主要大街的高價位時裝店，到城鎮邊緣的骯髒機械店舖；然而，台灣及大多數的亞洲國家都不吃這一套。你可以在聖羅蘭時裝店的隔壁看到一間機車修理舖，或是在大型銀行的旁邊發現廉價咖啡店或理髮院。相較於西方明確思想所驅動的僵硬線性都市機器，這種多型態的地下莖邏輯使台灣更快速地預先接受數位革命的電纜。台灣這個網絡是由許多彼此連結重疊的圓周中心所組成。像某些大型電視真人秀房屋，台灣每個人都配備著無線麥克風與行動電話。這場網路視訊的觀看從未停歇，筆記型電腦從不關機，而網路連結永遠開啟。台灣就像澳洲真人秀〈老大哥〉節目的參與成員一樣，總是活在一種偏執狂的狀態下，隨時都可能被身旁的卑鄙夥伴提名，然後被分散的善變大眾投票驅逐。事實上，迄今只有少數機會主義的太平洋島嶼投票者認為台灣是個真正的國家。



### *Paranoid-Taiwan*

The nerve racking paranoia of not knowing how many identities you really have, or who the real you is amongst your selves, or if anyone will recognise the real you in the house of nations is the cause of much anxiety amongst those nationalists who seek the status of being recognised as “an independent state”. For those postmodern, post structural digital citizens in Taiwan (and across the world) the schizo politics of collapsed singularities and the disappearance of any what Virilio dubs the “territorial contiguity of nations” opens up a freedom to recognise the polymorphic diversity of productive differences that inform the idea of Chinese-ness and Taiwan-ness inside the island platform. With such as huge number of Taiwanese travelling to study and live for extended periods in the West (just to name one mode of diversity) the idea of any homogeneous sense of a singular Taiwan is long gone. The challenge for all Taiwanese (and for the rest of us too) is to stop feeling too paranoid and negative about not having a singular identity in the old nationalist sense of a monolithic fixed state.

### 偏執台灣

對於那些企圖被認同為「獨立國家」的國家主義者而言，他們的不安感來自那種無法確知自己有幾種身分的偏執神經折磨，或是不知哪個自我才是真正的自己，或是在國家之中有誰能認出真正的自己。但對台灣的後結構數位市民（包括海外者在內）而言，在這塊島嶼平台上充斥的「中國性」與「台灣性」差異想法中，上述崩解個體的精神分裂政治與維希留所謂「國家領土的連結」的消失，正開啟了這種多型態變化認同的自由。隨便舉個變化模式，有相當多的台灣人遠赴西方國家長期留學，因此，任何單一台灣的同質意義早已消失。所有台灣人必須面對的挑戰，便是試著不再對缺乏單一身分感到過度偏執與負面，畢竟這種身分指的是舊式國家主義意義下的整體固定狀態。

